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I. INTRODUCTION
When the State of Florida or a political subdivision thereof proposes
highways, parks, or other public uses requiring acquisition of private land,
the practice today is to immediately condemn the land if funds have been
appropriated. In cases where the land will not be devoted immediately
to the public use, either the condemnor must wait until the needed funds
have been appropriated, during which time the land will often be devel-
oped; 1 or, if funds are available,2 the land will be condemned immediately
although it may not be devoted to the public use for several years.3 In
* Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor, Legal
Research and Writing I and II.
1. Recent instances have occurred in South Florida. Earl Crooks, Hialeah zoning con-
sultant, pointed out that the city was legally unable to refuse the granting of building
permits for the construction of warehouses on land that is slated for highway right-of-way
purposes:
Metro officials say the deal fits a pattern of land transactions in Hialeah which have
cost taxpayers thousands of extra dollars for the acquisition of recently improved
right of way land.
The Miami Herald, Nov. 29, 1968, § D, at 1, cols. 6-8.
2. Funds for advanced acquisitions are very limited, when they exist at all. For example,
in Dade County, for the fiscal year 1969, the Highway Department has been budgeted
$75,000 for all projects; only what is left after immediate projects are financed can be used
for advanced' acquisitions. Interview with Charles Crumpton, Assistant Director of the
Metropolitan Dade County Planning Department, in Miami, Dec. 31, 1968.
For parks and recreation areas, there are no funds at all budgeted for advanced
acquisitions for Dade County in the fiscal year 1969. Interview with Robert Perkins, Chief of
Planning and Programming, Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department,
in Miami, Dec. 31, 1968.
3. For authority for such advanced acquisition see, e.g., Carlor Co. v. City of Miami,
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the latter alternative, during the time which elapses before the land is
actually developed for the public use, the private use to which the land
was put ceases, and the economic benefit-profit to the land-owner, tax
revenue to the state, and the land's output for society-is lost.
The purpose of this article is to show that through a.modern method
of property acquisition-specifically, through acquisition of the develop-
ment rights of land-both the problem of increased condemnation ex-
penses caused by development of the land to be condemned and the prob-
lem of the three-fold economic loss described above can be avoided.
It must be pointed out, however, that a landowner's right to develop
his land to its most profitable use is basic to the concept of land owner-
ship. It is constitutionally protected.4 Yet it is subject to limitation; 5 and
the constitutional protection which it receives, as a property interest, is
that a taking of the land must be based on a proper exertion of the police
power and must be one for which just compensation is made.' The con-
cept of development right acquisition is based on the recognition of this
right, and further, on the recognition that a landowner's interest in de-
veloping his land is a severable component of his entire interest in, and
therefore of, the value of the land. As such, it is subject to acquisition
by the state, through condemnation, for example. The following example
will demonstrate how such acquisition might occur:
A owns an orange grove through which a highway is planned.
The value of the land as an orange grove is $2,000 per acre. Yet
the fair market value of the land is $4,500 per acre because it
could be developed into a housing subdivision.
Under methods presently existing, if the State Road Department
does not have immediate funds to condemn the land, it might well have
to condemn the land after housing has been constructed on it, obviously
at amounts greater than $4,500 per acre. Yet if it has sufficient funds to
condemn the land at $4,500 per acre, the economic benefit of A's income,
the state's tax revenues from the land, and the income from oranges oth-
erwise produced will be lost during the time that would elapse before the
highway could be constructed.
62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953) ; State Road Dept. v. Southland, Inc., 117 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1960), and authority contained therein.
4. Governmental action in the form of regulation which is so onerous as to constitute
a taking, constitutionally requires compensation. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1961), and authority cited in 26 Am. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 157 (1966).
For example, interference with the right to develop land by erecting billboards has been
held unreasonable and invalid, as not being necessary to the health, safety, and welfare of
the state or community, and therefore a taking of private property for public use without
compensation. Anderson v. Shackelford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917); see also Annot., 72
A.L.R. 469 (1931); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958).
5. For example, in the area of billboard construction (see note 3 supra), regulations as
to size and height, manner of construction, and maintenance will be upheld if they tend to
protect public safety, health, morals, or general welfare. See St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v.
St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1918), and generally 3 Am. JuR. 2d Advertising § 14 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).
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A development right acquisition act presents a much better alterna-
tive. First, the development right value of A's property would have to be
computed; it would be the difference between the value of the land at its
present use ($2,000 per acre) and the value of the land if developed
($4,500 per acre), or $2,500 per acre. Secondly, it is this development
right value component of A's interest in his property which should be the
subject of immediate acquisition. After such acquisition, A could con-
tinue to produce oranges on his land, profiting and paying taxes as
in the past, or he could sell the interest which he retained. Finally, when
the State Road Department is ready to begin road construction, it could
condemn the remaining interest in the land and acquire it at its current
value as an orange grove (perhaps more, or less, than the $2,000 per
acre value which existed at the time of the acquisition of the development
use). Therefore, the economic losses of A, of the state, and of society
would be avoided; the state would not have had to risk the condemnation
of developed land, and A will have been fully and fairly compensated.
II. EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR A DEVELOPMENT RIGHT
ACQUISITION STATUTE
A. The Development Right Interest as a Severable
Component of Value
In the leading case of Sutton v. Frazier,7 the legislature's power to
determine the nature of the interest to be taken through condemnation
was recognized. The court said,
[T]he legislature has full power to determine the nature of
the title to be acquired by the condemner [sic], since the consti-
tution of this state places no limitation or restriction on the na-
ture of the title to lands which may be acquired by the process
of eminent domain.
8
The Florida constitution similarly places no limitation or restriction
on the nature of the title which may be acquired. In the sections which
deal with eminent domain,9 the general terms of "property" and "private
property" are used.
The Florida legislature has exercised its power to determine the na-
ture of the title to be acquired and has progressively recognized different
interests. The first condemnation statute limited the right which could
be taken to that of an easement, or right to use the property.10 Subse-
quently, Florida's condemnation statutes provided specifically for "an
easement, an estate for years, or the fee simple title . or generally
7. 183 Kan. 33, 325 P.2d 338 (1958).
8. Id. at 41, 325 P.2d at 346.
9. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 9, FLA. CONST. art. X § 6 (1968).
10. FLA. REV. STAT. § 1564 (1892).
11. FLA. STAT. § 73.20 (1963).
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"the particular right or estate in said property sought .... The cur-
rent statutes refer simply to "the estate or interest in the property . . .,,"
These statutes alone are perhaps broad enough to allow condemnation of
the development right; in any case, they indicate the legislature's recogni-
tion that various interests in land can be acquired through eminent do-
main. The development right is another such interest and component of
value, and for the reasons mentioned should be specifically recognized
by statute to be subject to condemnation.
B. General Precedent
A development right acquisition act, entitled the English Town and
Country Act of 1947,"4 has existed in England since shortly after World
War II. It has been the means by which the development rights to land
have been expropriated with compensation, leaving the landowner with
the right to use and enjoy the land subject to the government's right to
keep the land undeveloped.
In the United States, similar results have been achieved through the
use of the power to condemn easements. Development rights have, in
effect, been taken by statutes which permit the state or municipality to
condemn easements15 for purposes such as to conserve future rights of
way and scenic easements for highways. 6 In the leading case of United
States v. Causby,17 the court found that a flight easement had been
taken (and ruled that compensation was necessary). This type of taking
not only condemns definite development rights but, in cases such as
Causby, also takes the existing use.
Set-back ordinances, which necessarily restrict development rights,
also have been upheld.x8 In one case a city was held to have the power
to condemn interests in strips of land abutting an avenue, thereby re-
stricting the owner's use to ornamental courtyard purposes.' 9
Easements restricting building heights similarly have been upheld
(when compensation is given).2 The Supreme Court of Minnesota has
recognized that the concept of condemnation includes the taking of cer-
tain development rights if the taking is for a public use.2 ' The court
12. Id. § 73.12.
13. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.021(3), 73.101 (1967) ; see also § 74.061.
14. 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51.
15. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.20 (1963).
16. E.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 84.09(1) (1957).
17. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
18. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Romer, 73 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954), where the court said
that if the ordinance is found to be a valid exercise of the police power the question remains
whether there has been such a deprivation of a beneficial use as to amount to a compensable
taking.
19. In re City of New York, 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N.Y.S. 196, aff'd mem., 167 N.Y.
624, 60 N.E. 1108 (1901).
20. See, e.g., Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 (1901); Piper v.
Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923).
21. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159
(1920).
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defined the restriction on the land use as a "taking,"22 and upheld the
condemnation statute which prohibited certain classes of buildings, on the
ground that a taking to insure fit and harmonious surroundings was a
taking for a public use.
C. Acquisition of Development Rights through
Open-Space Legislation
The Federal Housing Act of 196128 led the way, by providing federal
assistance, to the condemnation of land for the public needs of "necessary
recreational, conservation, and scenic areas .. 24
"Open-space land" is defined in the act as
any undeveloped or predominantly undeveloped land in an ur-
ban area which has value for (A) park and recreational pur-
poses, (B) conservation of land and other natural resources, or
(C) historic or scenic purposes.
25
Since the land is in an urban area and it is "undeveloped" or "pre-
dominantly undeveloped," it is clear that its greatest component of value
is the development right. The terminology used in the act is broad enough
to encompass the acquisition of the development right (so long as it is
not acquired only for a period of years), as section 1500a provides that
the Home Finance Administrator is authorized "to help finance the acqui-
sition of title to, or other permanent interests in, such land." (Emphasis
added.)
States have enacted open-space legislation in response to the federal
act.26 The language regarding the interest acquirable usually is broad
enough to encompass the acquisition of the development right. The fol-
lowing excerpt from the California act is typical:
[A]ny country or city may acquire, by purchase, gift, grant,
bequest, devise, lease or otherwise, and through the expenditure
of public funds, the fee or any lesser interest or right in real
property in order to preserve, through limitation of their future
use, open spaces and areas for public use and enjoyment.27
The New Jersey act specifically provided for what would be con-
sidered the acquisition of the development right. Consistent with the
American trend it is termed a "conservation easement," as contrasted
with the English method discussed under section II B, above. The act
provides:
22. Id. at 2, 176 N.W. 160.
23. §§ 701-706, 75 STAT. 185 (1961), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1500-1500(e) (Supp. 1961).
24. Id. § 1500(b).
25. Id. § 1500(e).
26. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6950-54; FLA. STAT. § 193.202 (1967) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66C, § 357 A (Supp. 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A to 8A-18 (1961); N.Y. Mutic.
LAW § 247 (Supp. 1961).
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6950 (emphasis added).
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Without limitation of the definition of "lands" herein, the com-
missioner may acquire, or approve grants to assist a local unit
to acquire: ... (b) an interest or right consisting, in whole or
in part, of a restriction on the use of land by others including
owners of other interests therein .... 28
If the commissioner were to acquire the development right, the interest
acquired would be a restriction on the use of the owner of the fee, who
falls within the statute.
Florida presently has a progressive act, discussed below, 29 whereby
open space may be set aside for recreational or park land purposes. °
This statute is based upon a landowner's taking the initiative to convey
development rights to the governing board of any county of this state
in exchange for tax assessment benefits, rather than on the state's acquir-
ing the development right through eminent domain.
D. The Development Right Acquisition Power by Implication
Although the acquisition of development rights is perhaps the most
modern idea in the law of property today, several established legal con-
cepts seem to point in its direction to such an extent as to imply an
existence of the power.
1. ADVANCED ACQUISITION
Advanced acquisition, or condemnation for a future use, was recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court as early as 1923 in the case
of Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County." Florida was one of the first states
to accept the doctrine.12 Six other states have similarly accepted it;88 in-
deed, no state legislature which has considered it has rejected it. Under
the doctrine, which will be discussed below in the light of the constitu-
tional requirement of "necessity," a condemnor has the power to condemn
property even though it will not be devoted to the public use until several
years into the future3
4
As was pointed out in the introduction to this paper, the economic
benefits to the individual, to the state, and to society in general are usu-
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-12 (1961) (emphasis added).
29. See discussion under § IV(A) infra.
30. FLA. STAT. § 193.202(1) (1967).
31. 262 U.S. 700 (1923). For another recent federal case, see Chapman v. Public Utility
Dist. No. 1, 367 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1966).
32. See discussion under § 1II(C) infra.
33. Berry v. Alabama Power Co., 257 Ala. 654, 60 So.2d 681 (1952) ; State ex rel. Sharp
v. 0.62033 Acres of Land, 49 Del. 174, 112 A.2d 857 (1955) ; Pike County Bd. of Education
v. Ford, 279 S.W.2d 679 (La. App. 1967), application denied, 251 La. 229, 203 So.2d 558;
Erwin v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 213 Miss. 895, 58 So.2d 52 (1952); State ex tel.
Hunter v. Super. Ct. for Snohomish County, 34 Wash. 2d 214, 208 P.2d 866 (1949).
34. Seven years was upheld in Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 861 (1966).
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ally lost during the time which elapses between condemnation and devel-
opment of the land for public use. It would certainly seem that since
jurisdictions have accepted the advanced acquisition concept with its in-
herent economic loss weakness, they would be willing to accept a develop-
ment right acquisition concept which would ultimately bring about the
same result but without the economic loss problem.
A difference between the two concepts which might lead to criticism
of the latter lies in the fact that development right acquisition will prob-
ably lead to more condemnations for public needs than have previously
been accepted under the case law. Although this objection is dealt with in
the constitutional section below, it seems that the public interest in avoid-
ing the three-fold economic loss, and the public interest in long range
planning, would justify such a result. It is also to be noted that the case
law has not set a limit, but has dealt with each case on its particular
facts.
2. RESTRICTIONS OF USE UNDER POLICE POWER
Insofar as it limits the use of land, the entire body of zoning law85
can be viewed as a type of development use acquisition. Although it is
acquisition without compensation, it is justified when used as a legitimate
exercise of the police powers of the state, i.e., when it is done to promote
public health, safety, morals, or welfare. 6 It is not suggested that the
term "public welfare" should include an avoidance of the economic loss
that results without a development use acquisition act, so as to enable
the state to condemn development rights without compensation under the
police power. But it is to be pointed out that, even without compensation,
the state does have the power to restrict the use of land for the general
welfare of the public. It seems not so great a step to recognition of the
state power to restrict land to an existing use by means of the compen-




In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, states, as opposed to
the federal government, are not necessarily restricted by a "public use"
requirement. The Supreme Court of Florida, in Demeter Land Co. v.
Florida Public Service Co.,8 7 pointed out this somewhat surprising fact by
saying:
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States prohibits the taking of private property for a "public
35. See generally, 58 Am. JuR. Zoning (1948), 101 C.J.S. Zoning (1958).
36. See generally, 58 Amd. JuR. Zoning § 26 (1948), 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 7 (1958) and
authority contained therein.
37. 99 Fla. 954, 128 So. 402 (1930).
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use" without just compensation. It is necessarily implied from
the language there used that private property cannot be taken
for any other purpose without the consent of the owner. How-
ever, this amendment was not intended to limit the powers of
the state governments, but to operate on the national govern-
ment alone.88
The court pointed out that many states have constitutional provi-
sions similar to the federal one requiring a "public use," but after analyz-
ing the appropriate sections of the Florida constitution, concluded that
there is no "public use" requirement contained therein. 9 The court ex-
plained that "[t]he framers of the Constitution left it to the Legislature
to declare the use for which property may be taken without the consent
of the owner . . .40
Under the Demeter Land Co. rule it was clear, then, that if a "public
use" requirement existed in Florida, it did so because the legislature wrote
it into a particular eminent domain statute. The statute under considera-
tion in the Demeter Land Co. case did contain such a requirement; the
court, therefore, had to face the problem of defining the term "public use"
and cited the following as "one of the best definitions" it had found:
A use to be public must be fixed and definite. It must be
one in which the public, as such, has an interest, and the terms
and manner of its enjoyment must be within the control of the
State, independent of the rights of the private owner of the
property appropriated to the use. The use of property cannot
be said to be public if it can be gainsaid, denied, or withdrawn
by the owner. The public interest must dominate the private
gain.4'
Before discussing the public use requirement in connection with the
development right condemnation statute under contemplation, it is neces-
sary to trace the development of the case law since Demeter. Despite the
Supreme Court's holding in Demeter, the court subsequently stated
42
that when the state legislature delegates the power of eminent domain,
it must limit the exercise of that power to areas where there is a "public
interest. '43 In other words, the court has imposed the public use require-
ment where the constitution has not done so, at least in areas where the
state has delegated its eminent domain power.4
Subsequent Florida decisions have also refused to adopt the liberal
view of the court in Demeter. In Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard
38. Id. at 961-62, 128 So. at 405-406.
39. Id. at 963, 128 So. at 406.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Orange County v. Fordham, 160 Fla. 259, 34 So.2d 438 (1948).
43. Id. at 264, 34 So.2d at 440.
44. It is interesting to note that the court cited no authority for the requirement in
such a case, however.
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County,4 5 the court refused to allow a county to condemn private land
for public hunting and fishing purposes. The court did not, however,
restrict the public use requirement so as to prohibit condemnation for
public park purposes; rather, it based its decision on the fact that the
legislature had written a "public necessity" (emphasis added) require-
ment into the applicable statute.46 The court admitted that there was a
statute passed in 1925 regarding the acquisition of land for playground
and recreational centers which did not impose a "necessity" requirement,
but pointed out that the statute did not expressly grant the power of
eminent domain. Furthermore, the court refused to decide whether the
power could be implied under the statute. Further evidence of the fact
that the court had not intended to restrict in general "public use" to
"public necessity" is the statement that, absent the amendment to Florida
Statutes section 12 7.01 requiring "public necessity," "a presumption would
have arisen in favor of the county's resolution to take the land.
'4 7
The Peavy-Wilson decision was subsequently cited for the general
proposition that "[a] first essential for the acquirement of private prop-
erty by this great power [i.e., eminent domain] is, that it shall be for a
public purpose."4 8 In other decisions, the courts apparently thought the
idea of public use to be so ingrained in Florida law that no citation to
authority was made in support of the proposition that private property
can be condemned only when it will serve a public purpose.49 Two recent
decisions were based on the reasoning that a taking of private property,
if not for public use, would violate constitutional rights. In one of these
cases5" federal rights guarded against state interference by the fourteenth
amendment were said to require that the taking be for a public purpose;
in the other,5 ' the simple constitutional (no reference was made to which
constitution) guarantees of due process and prohibition against taking
without compensation were said to "decree that the use for which the
) 52property is taken must be a public use ....
Finally, it is abundantly clear now that a public purpose requirement
exists in Florida as the Constitution of Florida, as recently amended, im-
poses one.5 Of course, the term will have to be defined, and this probably
will be done in the light of the case law definitions of "public use." The
clearest definition of public use is still the one given in Demeter.5 4 It is
against this definition that condemnation of development rights will be
tested.
45. 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d 483 (1947).
46. FLA. STAT. § 127.01(2) (1945).
47. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 316, 31 So.2d 483, 486
(1947).
48. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 785 (Fla. 1952).
49. See, e.g., Osceola County v. Triple Development Co., 90 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. 1956).
50. Brest v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority, 194 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
51. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So.2d 368 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
52. Id. at 371.
53. FLA. CONST. art. X § 6A (1968).
54. See definition in text accompanying note 5, supra.
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
It must be pointed out that the specific question of whether or not
land of which the development rights are to be condemned would ulti-
mately be put to a "public use" cannot be answered here. Existing case law
would control in each instance, and a separate inquiry would perhaps be
made each time the statutes were utilized to acquire land for highway,
school, public building, park and reservation, or other purposes. What
must be answered here is the question whether, assuming that a public
use will be made of the land when it is finally condemned in fee simple,
there is public interest in the preliminary condemnation of the develop-
ment right.
The answer to the foregoing question, under the definition set down
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Demeter,'5 can only be in the affirma-
tive. That definition can be broken down into the following elements:
(1) definiteness
(2) state control
(3) dominance of public interest over private gain.
As to the definiteness element, it was pointed out 6 that the "public
use" to be derived from the employment of development right acquisi-
tion is (1) the saving of the economic value to the community which
would be lost through immediate condemnation for a future use, (2) the
saving of public funds that would be required to condemn the land at a
later date with its improvements, and (3) the continued tax revenue to
be derived from the land kept at its present use, which revenue would be
lost if the land were condemned in fee simple before it was to be put to
its eventual use. The use is three-fold and definite.
As to the second element, state control, it is clear that the rights of
the landowner would be subordinated to the control of the condemning
body, both as to the restriction on the existing use and as to the time
when the body would condemn the remaining interest in the land.
Finally, as to the dominance of the public interest over private gain,
it must be pointed out that there is no private gain to be derived from
the employment of the development right acquisition method. The land-
owner will continue to receive the same economic benefit from his land,
subject only to the same economic forces which he would have faced in
any event. The only gain that could be said to exist is the continued eco-
nomic benefit which would have been lost if condemnation of the fee
simple had been effected. In any case, the three-fold public interest,
which would be "new," outweighs this private gain. In addition, the
Supreme Court of Florida has stated that the fact that an agency may
sell or lease property to private interests after the land has been cleared
does not render the condemnation one for a private use or purpose rather
than one for a public use. 7 Certainly, if an agency may sell property to
55. Id.
56. See introduction.
57. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1959).
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private interests, it should be allowed to condemn development rights and
allow a landowner to maintain, for a period of time, the existing use with-
out rendering the condemnation one for a private purpose rather than one
for a public purpose.
B. Full Compensation
It might seem that a constitutional objection could be raised against
a development right acquisition act on the ground that full compensation
is not given for the entire value of the land at the time of the condemna-
tion of the development right. However, a study of case law reveals that
full compensation is relative to the right taken; it is not a requirement
that the property be "fully taken and fully compensated." The Supreme
Court of Florida has said,
The constitutional right to compensation for property taken by
eminent domain under section 29 of article 16 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Florida is the full and perfect equivalent of
the right taken.58
Subsequently, the Supreme Court declared, "Full compensation
means nothing less than payment for that which the property owner is
being deprived of." 59
In addition, the idea that a landowner has a development right inter-
est in his land, which interest must be compensated for during condemna-
tion, is not a new concept in federal or Florida law. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that:
[t]he sum to be paid the owner does not depend upon the
uses to which he has devoted it, or if he is not using it at all
upon the uses to which he expects to devote it, but is to be ascer-
tained on just consideration of all the uses to which it is suit-
able. 0
The same court thereafter said:
In determining [property] value, the highest and most
profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed,
or is likely to be needed in the near future, is to be consid-
ered .... 61
The Supreme Court of Florida has aligned itself with the above view.
In adopting the so-called "Texas rule," the court said,
[I]n arriving at market value consideration may be given
to all of the uses to which the property of the condemnee is rea-
58. City of Jacksonville v. Schaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 374, 114 So. 888, 891 (1932) (emphasis
added).
59. Meyers v. City of Daytona Beach, 158 Fla. 859, 862, 30 So.2d 354, 355 (1947).
60. Atlantic Coast Line RR. v. United States, 132 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1943)
(emphasis added).
61. St. Joe Paper Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1946).
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sonably adaptable and for which it either is or in all reasonable
probability will become available within the reasonable future.62
Thus, it is clear that the courts are recognizing more and more that
development rights are a component of the value of, and the interest in,
an individual's property.
C. Necessity
The constitutional objection that can be raised against condemnation
for future use is that of "necessity," i.e., whether there is a necessity for
the present taking of land when it will not be devoted to a public use
until some time in the future. Before discussing this objection as it has
been raised in and treated by the Florida courts, it should be pointed out
that in a development right acquisition proceeding, what is condemned is
not in reality condemned for a future purpose. The public purposes dis-
cussed above take effect immediately upon the acquisition of the devel-
opment rights. The only thing that could be objected to, as being too far
in the future to satisfy the necessity requirement, is the ultimate use to
which the land will be put. Nevertheless, in the cases that have come be-
fore the Florida courts the landowners have had their land taken immedi-
ately, even though the land was not put to public use for as long as
seven years.0 3 The point is that in a development right acquisition, where
the landowner is not deprived of his existing use and where public use of
the right acquired is made immediately, 4 the necessity requirement
should not logically be as stringent as it is in a proceeding for the con-
demnation of the fee simple. In the latter, no limit has yet been set; but,
again, a seven-year period has been upheld.65 A ten-year period seems a
reasonable statutory limit for a development right acquisition proceeding;
it will be so proposed in the act which follows this paper.
As mentioned above, in Carlor Co. v. City of Miami,6  the Supreme
Court of Florida upheld a condemnation, even though seven years had
elapsed between the time of condemnation and the beginning of the
development of the land. The court said,
It is not necessary that a political subdivision of the state
have money on hand, plans and specifications prepared and all
other preparations necessary for immediate construction before
62. Bd. of Comm'rs of State Inst. v. City of Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 116 So.2d
762, 764 (Fla. 1959).
63. Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So.2d 897, 902 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
861 (1966) (condemnation upheld).
64. It is true that the public will derive no actual benefit if the land is not finally con-
demned and put to the ultimate public use intended (and therefore a limit on the power is
necessary). But, at the time of the condemnation, the public nevertheless obtains what can
aptly be designated as a vested interest subject to divestment (by the passage of a specified
period of time during which the state fails to make the final condemnation).
65. Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So.2d 897, 902 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
$61 (1966).
66. 62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 861 (1966).
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it can determine the necessity for taking private property for a
public purpose. 7
The court went on to emphasize that "[i]t is the duty of public officials
to look to the future and plan for the future."
68
Subsequently, in State Road Department of Florida v. Southland,
Inc.,69 the court, citing the Carlor case and other authority for the power
to condemn for a future purpose, pointed to "the duty of public officials
to build and plan not only for the present but for the foreseeable
future.1 70 The court emphasized7" that the Florida Highway Code au-
thorized the Road Department to acquire by eminent domain:
All necessary lands and property for the purpose of
securing rights of way, borrow pits and drainage ditches for
existing, proposed or anticipated roads in the state highway
system or state park road system.
72
It is clear, then, that the state legislature as well as the courts have
recognized that the power of eminent domain can be used to acquire
land for future needs. Similarly, federal law, as pointed out in the
Southland case, 73 has authorized advanced acquisitions.74 The Carlor-
Southland approach is apparently a growing trend in the jurisdictions of
this country; for example, the Carlor reasoning has been adopted by the
Supreme Courts of Hawaii 75 and Oklahoma.
7
1
D. Delegation of the Power of Eminent Domain
It has long been clear that the power of eminent domain is dele-
gable,77 and there should therefore be no problem in allowing the de-
velopment right acquisition power to be delegated to state agencies. Of
course, the state agency to which the power is delegated
is subject to the dominant organic provisions requiring due
process of law and just compensation in appropriating private
property to the use of highways or other public purposes under
the law.78
67. Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. 117 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960).
70. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 516.
72. FLA. STAT. § 337.27 (1967) (emphasis added).
73. 117 So.2d at 515-16.
74. The Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 STAT. § 108, does so, and makes federal funds
available for future rights-of-way on the condition that they be constructed within a five-
year period.
75. State v. Ruiz, 42 Haw. 494, 421 P.2d 304 (1966).
76. Brooks v. LeGrand, 435 P.2d 142 (Okla. 1967).
77. Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926).
78. Id. at 630, 110 So. at 454.
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Furthermore, "[w]hen the right of eminent domain is delegated with
conditions to its exercise, the performance of the conditions is subject to
judicial cognizance. 79
IV. METHODS OF AcQUIRING THE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS OF LAND
A. Conveyance in Exchange for Tax Benefits
Under the present Florida statute regarding outdoor recreational or
park land, 0 the owner or owners in fee of land being used for outdoor
recreational or park purposes may either convey the development rights
of their land or covenant for a term of not less than ten years that the
land will not be used for any purpose other than 6utdoor or recreational
purposes. The statute defines any covenant used to be one running
with the land.8 '
In exchange for the giving up of the development right, the land-
owner will receive as a tax benefit the assessment of his land "as outdoor
recreational or park lands upon an acreage basis, so long as such lands
are actually used for outdoor recreational or park purposes.18 2 The
statute is explicit that "[i]n valuing such land for tax purposes, an
assessor or any taxing agency shall consider no factors other than those
relative to its value for the present use .... ,78
Beyond this tax incentive, there are other forces which may come
into play to induce a landowner to give up development rights under
this statute. For example, in cases where home sites are to be sold at
higher prices because they abut what the developer promises will be a golf
course, the purchasers can refuse to accept the developer's mere promise
but may actually require him to convey development rights to the
governing board of the county (or covenant not to develop the land).
California has a similar statute whereby tax benefits can be derived
by entering into use restriction agreements with governmental agencies.
Under the statute, the tax assessor is required to "consider the effect upon
value [of the land] of any enforceable restrictions to which the use of
the land may be subjected. 81 4 These restrictions, the act provides,
shall include but are not necessarily limited to zoning restric-
tions limiting the use of land and any recorded contractual
provisions limiting the use of lands entered into with a govern-
mental agency pursuant to state laws or applicable local ordi-
nances.
85
Maryland, too, has passed a tax credit provision for land determined
to be open-space and
79. Id.
80. FLA. STAT. § 193.202 (1967).
81. FLA. STAT. § 193.202(6)(e) (1967).
82. FLA. STAT. § 193.202(3) (1967).
83. Id.
84. CAL. REv. & TAx § 402.1 (1967).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
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for which the owner or predecessor in title has permanently
conveyed or assigned to the State or other designated govern-
mental bodies an easement or interest in the land which limits
the use thereof in such manner as to preserve its natural open
character in perpetuity.
86
The tax credit can be up to 50% in some categories of open-space8 7 and
up to 100% in others."8
These statutes are, of course, fine as far as they go, but they are
permissive rather than mandatory. Clearly, when the state or a political
subdivision thereof finds it in the public interest to acquire development
rights in order to prevent development in areas to be condemned, in order
to avoid the economic loss incident to advanced acquisition, it must also
have a development right acquisition statute under which to exercise
eminent domain power in dealing with a landowner who is not willing to
convey development rights in exchange for tax benefits.
B. Condemnation and Lease-Back
The Model Eminent Domain Code Draft89 provides a method by
which, in effect, the development right of land can be condemned. Section
311 of the Code, subsection A of which was used in part in the drafting
of the Development Right Acquisition Act of 1969 (proposal), enables
a governmental subdivision to acquire in advance land which will be
devoted to a public use "within a reasonable time." Before the land is
cleared for the public use intended, it can be leased back to the prior
owner or to someone else if the prior owner declined the leasing right.
The land therefore would not be unused; and the prior economic benefit,
not lost. Furthermore, under subsection 311 C, the land would be subject
to taxation. It is clear, too, that the problem of the possibility of increased
acquisition costs at a later date is avoided.
The major difference between this method and the direct method
of development right acquisition is that in the former the funds necessary
for advanced acquisition must be at hand, which funds, it was pointed
out,90 are often not available. In addition, all the responsibility con-
nected with land ownership would rest on the state rather than on the
private individual under the condemnation, lease-back method.
The following are salient aspects of the model code draft:
A. Such governmental subdivision and agency which has been
given the power of condemnation by law may, for projects or
otherwise, which have been approved by the condemnor and by
the governing body of the appropriate political entity, after
a general plan has been adopted by said body, as the same may
86. 7 MD. ANN. CODE art. 81 § 12E (Cum. Supp. 1967).
87. Id. § 12E(c).
88. Id. § 12E(d).
89. 2 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 365 (1967).
90. See discussion in note 2, supra.
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be amended, acquire lands and interests therein in fee simple, or
lesser, in advance of the time of the adoption of a budget
including such lands and interests. Such power may be exercised
when, in the judgment of the condemnor, the public interest
will be served and economy effectuated by forestalling develop-
ment of such land, which will entail greater acquisition costs at
a later date, and when such exercise is determined to be neces-
sary, convenient, and desirable.
B. Upon such acquisition, the condemnor may improve, use,
maintain, or lease such lands until the same are required for
public use. There may necessarily be a period of time between
the acquisition of needed lands and the commencement of
actual site clearance and the construction, but such fact shall
not minimize the public purpose of such acquisition, provided
that it can be determined that such lands will be used for the
purpose for which they were acquired within a reasonable time.
C. The owner of such land at the time of acquisition under
this section shall have the first right to enter into lease thereof
with the condemnor until such lands are needed for public
use. Any land so leased shall be subject to general property
taxation during the term of the lease. All rentals shall be
credited to the project land acquisition account ...
D. A condemnor with authority to acquire land under this sec-
tion shall also have authority to dispose of land, or part of it,
if it determines there is no longer need for such property for
present or future purposes and if the public interests will be
best served by such disposition. In the event of disposition, first
priority of repurchase at an amount equivalent to the current
fair market value of the property shall be accorded to the
former owner for such property. If such owner fails to re-
purchase within a reasonable time, the land shall be advertised
for public sale by sealed bids and sold forthwith to the highest
bidder.
C. Development Right Acquisition
For the reasons given throughout this paper, it is apparent that
public interest requires some means of acquiring the development right
of land. The weaknesses of several available or suggested means have
been demonstrated. It becomes clear that a statute providing a direct
means of development right acquisition is needed. The concluding section
of this paper presents the writer's proposal for such a statute.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT RIGHT ACQUISITION ACT OF 1969-A PROPOSAL
(to be a new chapter in Florida Statutes)
Section I Short Title.-
This act may be cited as the Development Right Acquisi-
tion Act of 1969.
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Section II Definition.-
"Development right," whenever used as referred to in this
act, shall mean the right of the owner of the fee interest in the
land to change the use of the land from its existing use to any
other use.
Section III Procedure.-
(1) The state, the governing board of any county or any
municipality in this state, or any other governmental subdivision
or agency which has been given the power to acquire property by
law may, for projects or otherwise which have been approved
by the acquiring body and by the governing body of the ap-
propriate political entity, after a general plan has been adopted
by said body, as the same may be amended, acquire the de-
velopment right of lands therein, in advance of the time of the
adoption of a budget to finance the acquisition of the land
in fee simple, or less, and the development thereof to a public
purpose. Such power may be exercised when, in the judgment
of the acquiring body, the public interest will be served and
economy effectuated by forestalling acquisition in fee simple,
or less, and development of such land, which would entail
greater acquisition costs at a later date, and when such exercise
is determined to be necessary, convenient and desirable. This
act is in addition to all other provisions of Florida law dealing
with the acquisition of property or any rights therein, in whole
or in part.
(2) If the acquisition is to be through the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, in addition to following the pro-
cedure set forth in Chapter 72 of Florida Statutes, the con-
demnor shall set forth in the petition the following:
(a) an explanation why public interest requires the acqui-
sition of the development right before the land is to be ac-
quired in fee simple, or less.
(b) a general plan for the development of the land ulti-
mately to be acquired including the setting of a date certain at
which time the land will be condemned in fee simple, or less;
in no case shall such a date be more than ten (10) years after the
date of the condemnation of the development right of such
land.
Comment:
This section is set up in two subsections to make clear the legislative
intent that acquisition may be by means other than eminent domain
proceedings, such as by purchase or gift. Subsection (2) requires in the
case of eminent domain proceedings that the satisfaction of the public use
or interest requirement discussed above9" be shown in the petition itself.
91. 2 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 365 (1967).
92. See pp. 353-57.
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VoL. XXIII
Some of the language of subsection (1) was taken from subsection 311 A
of the Model Eminent Domain Code Draft."3
Section IV Compensation.-
(1) Where the development right of land is acquired by
means other than through eminent domain proceedings, as by
gift or purchase, the land owners compensation shall be deter-
mined by the agreement of the parties involved.
(2) Where the development right of land is acquired
through eminent domain proceedings, the procedure shall be in
accordance with Chapter 73 of Florida Statutes, and the amount
of full compensation shall be based on the difference between
the fair market value of the land and the value of the land for
the use to which it was devoted at the time of the acquisition.
When the fee simple, or lesser interest, is subsequently
condemned, the grantor's compensation shall be based on a cur-
rent appraisal of the value of the land at the use permitted at the
date of the subsequent acquisition.
Comment:
This section is designed to clarify the manner in which compensa-
tion shall be measured to comply with the full compensation requirement
discussed above. 4 It is suggested that Chapter 73 of Florida Statutes be
amended to clarify that "property," as used therein, is defined as property
interest.
The second paragraph of subsection (2) is to emphasize that there
will be at the time of the condemnation of the fee simple, or less, a current
appraisal of the land at the use permitted after the condemnation of the
development right.
Section V Reconveyance of the development right.-
(1) The owner of the land of which the development right
has been acquired under this act shall not change the use of
said land from the use existing at the time of the acquisition of
the development right without first obtaining a written instrument
from the body which has acquired the development right, which
instrument re-conveys all or part of the development right
to said owner and which instrument must be promptly recorded
in the same manner as any other instrument affecting the title
to real estate.
(2) No governmental body which holds title to a develop-
ment right pursuant to this act shall convey said development
right to anyone other than the record holder of the fee simple in-
terest in the land to which the development right attaches, and
the conveyance to said owner of the fee shall be made only after a
determination by said governmental body that such conveyance
93. See pp. 361-62.
94. See pp. 357-58.
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would not adversely affect the interest of the public. Section
125.35, Florida Statutes, shall not apply to such sales, but any
governmental body which has acquired a development right pur-
suant to this act shall forthwith adopt appropriate regulations
and procedures governing the disposition of the same. These reg-
ulations and procedures shall provide the terms of the convey-
ance, including the compensation to be paid by the grantee. No
development right shall be conveyed by any governmental body
without first holding a public hearing and unless notice of the
proposed conveyance and the time and place that the public
hearing is to be held shall be published once a week for at least
two (2) weeks in some newspaper of general circulation in the
county involved prior to said hearing.
Comment:
It should be noted that under subsection (2) the owner in fee of
the land shall be required to compensate the governmental body in the
case of a re-conveyance of the development right.
Section VI Taxation; assessment.-
Any land the development right of which has been acquired
shall not be exempt from general property taxation. In valuing
such lands for tax purposes, an assessor or any taxing agency
shall consider no factor other than those relative to its value for
the use existing at the time of the acquisition of the develop-
ment right or, in the case of a re-conveyance under section 4
of the act, for the use permitted after such re-conveyance.
Section VII Prevention of waste and irreparable injury.-
The body which has acquired the development right shall
have the power to file appropriate action to prevent waste or to
enjoin irreparable injury which will affect the value of the land
as it will be used when developed to the ultimate public use,
unless such waste or irreparable injury is necessarily incidental
to the use permitted.
Section VIII Inter-governmental agreements.-
In order to effectuate an orderly exercise of power under
this section, the agencies and subdivisions of government ac-
corded such power are authorized to enter into agreement with
each other, or with the federal government, respecting the
financing, planning, or acquisition of property needed for future
use, in order to facilitate the general objective of a reasonable
program of acquisition of land for future use.
Section IX Effective Date.-
This act will be effective immediately upon becoming law.
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